3/13/2023 0 Comments Tantra unveiled pdfHe argues that there is an androcentric bias embedded in the speculative outlook of medieval kabbalah, as he reads the texts through a psychoanalytic lens. the interpretative strategies employed by Elliot Wolfson in his detailed work on Jewish mysticism. For the comparative assessment of these two distinctive approaches I shall use as a point of departure. It demonstrates a reflective consciousness by the adept or master in understanding the place of God’s being, as a supernal and mundane reality. In this paper I consider the way in which divinity is realized through an imaginary locus in the mystical thought of Jewish kabbalah and Hindu tantra. the constitution of the factual world and the factual life of the mind. The paper ends with a brief comment on Husserl's broader view of metaphysics, having to do with the irrationality of the transcendental fact, i.e. Presuming that, if consciousness is to be the subject-matter of a metaphysics which is not simply speculative or based on prejudice, it is crucial to get the phenomenology of consciousness right, the paper then engages in a detailed descriptive-eidetic analysis of mental acts of re-presenting something and tries to argue that their structures, involving components of non-actual experiencing, pose a serious problem for a materialistic or physicalistic metaphysics of consciousness. science which has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, has to do with its reality or actuality, requiring an eidetic foundation in order to become scientifically valuable. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori. The paper first addresses Husserl's conception of philosophical phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl's view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of consciousness. Thus, even though directing the light of description on things is undeniably a way of revealing them, it also has a way of concealing them. The world spoken is a projection, a façade obscuring the true reality of the phenomena projected. The mind’s eye and the eye itself are separate organs, and to imagine that we see the same way in language as we do in sensory perception is to repeat the errors of rationalism. It is argued that description is an act of creation and that, as such, its products should never be mistaken for that from out of which they are created. Given that language provides us with a special kind of sightedness, and given that this seeing through language is fundamentally different from perception, how can one avoid the conclusion that, in language, phenomena are transformed? This is the central question confronted in this paper. In support of this claim, examples are offered from two philosophers the author regards as most representative of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, of what seems to be evidence that neither saw into the problem as well as Nietzsche – Merleau-Ponty, in fact, seeming to have missed it almost altogether, and Heidegger seeing in it a spectre he was anxious to put to rest! this problem than any other major theorist before or since, and that his understanding goes to the heart of things phenomenological. The author contends that Nietzsche saw better into. For corroboration, it relies on a section in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science in which he gives his most prolonged explanation of what he calls “the essence” of his understanding of “phenomenalism and perspectivism” (Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. This paper deals with the implications of the limitations of language for phenomenological description.
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